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The Army communicated its approach towards Army 2020 to Congress and also to internal and external audiences through the Army's 2012 posture statement, The
Nation's Force of Decisive Action: A Statement on the Posture of the United States
Army 2012. 8 Correspondingly, the Army's 2012 and 2013 strategic planning guidance documents expanded upon this approach. 9 The posture statement describes a force that will build on the past decade of transformation and remain engaged abroad in support of obligations while emerging from budget reductions as a leaner but still very capable force in the coming years.
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Over the next five years, the Army will decrease its end-strength from a peak authorized strength of about 570,000 to 490,000 Active Army, 358,000 to 353,500 Army National Guard and 206,000 to 205,000 Army Reserve Solders as directed. Reducing our end strength over a deliberate ramp through the end of fiscal year 2017 allows the Army to . . . facilitate reversibility in an uncertain strategic environment.
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An outcome of DoD and Army guidance was the concept of reversibility and expansibility: a plan to reduce the operating force in a way that preserves the Army's ability to expand select capabilities in the force to meet future, unforeseen demands. 12 Correspondingly, expansibility became a tenet of the Army's integrated plan for 2020.
The terms 'reversible' and 'expandable' are contained in the most recent published DoD and Army strategic guidance documents. 13 However, a few months after issuing the Army's posture statement, the Army adopted the terms 'Investment and Regeneration' to characterize proactive, measured efforts to reduce the force in a manner that preserves the ability to restore needed capabilities and capacity if needed for future requirements.
14 Army Investment and Regeneration (I&R) applies to most of the operating force in four major categories: Modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), support formations (functional and multifunctional brigades), echelon above brigade enablers, and new capabilities. What the Army retains and develops in these four categories will form the basis of the requirements for regeneration. Consequently, I&R will impact both the operating and generating force and the overarching concept will affect both the active and reserve components.
The Army has already developed the BCT I&R framework in some detail to enable planning. This is a logical leading effort as the quantity and internal structure of BCTs in the force influences the requirements for the type and quantity of supporting enablers. 15 Moreover, responding to DoD directives to reduce endstrength, the Army has already decided to reduce at least eight active BCTs from the force in the coming years as part of the integrated plan for Army 2020. 16 To inform emerging BCT I&R efforts as well as the related force structure modifications across the operating force, this paper will focus on BCTs. The paper highlights observations from recent Army expansion efforts; examines existing assumptions guiding BCT I&R; and addresses the Army courses of action for BCT I&R that are still in development. Finally, the paper examines alternative BCT I&R options, and proposes recommendations in support of I&R as part of an integrated Army 2020 force structure design plan.
It is important to note that this paper is predicated on an Army proposal that reorganizes BCTs from the existing modular BCTs into fewer, but much more capable, versatile and agile organizations. The proposal includes the addition of a third maneuver battalion to BCTs. As a result of this reorganization, the Army's BCTs would be better Defense Reform, the objectives of these reform initiatives have been: downsizing the force to an acceptable level of risk; modernizing the force to ensure that it retained a qualitative advantage; reshaping and transforming the force so that the military would remain without peer; and reforming defense practices. 19 In the Base Force Review and Bottom-Up Review, the Army, as well as other services, significantly reduced their force structure.
Paradoxically, through all four reviews, the Army's scope of missions in support of the Nation's security strategies expanded to create the need for a more responsive, networked and expeditionary force. 20 These expanded roles drove increased tension between budget constraints and readiness requirements. In response, the 2001 force transformation effort attempted to improve the capabilities of a smaller force while meeting an increased range of strategic demands. 21 As the Army progressed in the early years of transformation, it also focused on improving the training and education of its Soldiers to meet new technical and technological challenges posed by the digital and networked force. Many of these same factors continue to affect the projected manning requirements for the expansion of the future modular force especially related to the availability of low density, highly skilled personnel. 35 Likewise, the Army had to balance funding for transformation with competing priorities within the Army and amongst the greater DoD. 36 Focusing on the Army's ability to invest in and field the Interim Force (SBCTs), a coordinated, integrated and iteratively synchronized campaign plan enabled the Army to realize its desired capability outcome. initiative has many parallels to I&R: "efforts to rebalance force structure and make investment decisions that will shape the Army of 2020 -all during time of war." 40 
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In the early years of modularity (2003) (2004) (2005) , the Army quickly reorganized two of its divisions (3rd Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division) to establish the first series of modular BCTs. In parallel, TRADOC established a modularity task force to develop the long-term modular conversion concepts for the entire operating force. 41 The
Army extended the modularity effort to include its remaining active divisions and the BCTs in the ARNG through 2010 (see Figure 2 ). As BCT modularity progressed, the Army also conducted the modular reorganization of combat support and combat service support brigades across all three components of the Army. The magnitude of achieving modularity, coupled with other major transformation initiatives, raises long-term affordability issues for DoD. Until the Army more fully defines the requirements and potential costs associated with modularity, DoD will not be well positioned to weigh competing priorities and make informed decisions. . .
47
I&R plans should continue to be informed by Modular Conversion lessons related to equipping the force, manning formations, the evolution of cost estimates, and validating desired force capabilities. During the first four years of modular conversion the Army was challenged to fully equip modular units in accordance with the organizational design for the BCTs. 48 A key factor was the imperative to first resource deployed and deploying units. 49 However, the Army did establish a dynamic priority system for equipping all components to support changing readiness cycles and rotational deployments. 50 Nevertheless, the Army's support to operational commitments, coupled with modular conversion, was "outpacing the planned acquisition or funding for some equipment requirements." 51 This friction amongst competing priorities will occur during future regeneration efforts. Even with comprehensive investment actions and a robust pool of stored equipment, invariably new equipment to counter emerging enemy capabilities will be required and developed for existing and regenerated combat forces.
In the early years of modularity, to ease the manning demand associated with ongoing operations and conversion, the Army had success with military-to-civilian conversions and securing the statutory authority to reduce active personnel support to the reserve component. In 2005, the Army converted approximately 8,000 military positions in the generating force to civilian positions. 52 These military positions were mostly transferred to the operating force. Additionally, the Army also had the authority to move up to 1,500 active Soldiers from reserve component support to the operating force. 53 However, these measures were still insufficient to meet the total manpower demands for senior level Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and mid-grade officers.
Consequently, newly converted BCTs were not fully manned with leaders at the required grade and skill level. Over the course of implementing modularity the shortage of available mid-grade officers and NCOs actually hindered the rapid growth of modular formations. 54 Paradoxically, the long-term manning for modularity actually depended upon reducing the overall active component endstrength from a temporary authorization level while concurrently increasing the size of the operational combat force. 55 However, the success of increasing the available military manpower with the conversion of military positions to civilian positions within the generating force provides a viable option to source future I&R regeneration efforts provided that the Army replenishes the generating force. 56 The ability to fully understand and forecast funding requirements was a more billion. 57 A 2005 GAO report asserted that part of the reason for the dramatic cost increase was a lack of an overall framework for tracking modularity obligations that differentiated modularity costs and expenditures from those normally associated with preparing units for deployment. 58 This convoluted cost accounting prevented accurate cost estimates associated with implementing modularity. Importantly, Modular
Conversion was not limited to just BCTs and it included equipment procurement and facility construction on a scale that BCT I&R will likely not have to address. 59 Notwithstanding, the sources of the dramatic increases in modularity costs can still provide valuable insights in more accurately projecting costs for the proposed I&R concepts. 60 Significantly, I&R will likely be conducted in an environment of increasing fiscal constraints requiring greater accuracy for the Army's cost projections. A small scale experiment examining the regeneration of a BCT could provide insights into the 13 complexity and costs of the regeneration concept and also provide better estimates of needed investments in equipment and manpower.  The decision to regenerate capabilities will be directed in response to an unforeseen requirement or change in the defense strategy post FY18.
 No new Divisional Headquarters will be generated; the (3) regenerated Infantry BCTs will be assigned one (1) each to three (3) existing Divisions.
 Army will identify up to 5k mid-grade officers/NCOs in the generating force to support BCT advance party (ADVON) assignment and enabler force manning.
 It will take 18 months from execution to earliest arrival date.
 Equipping shortfalls could be mitigated by utilizing equipment from the most recently reduced IBCTs; retain 3xIBCT sets for training and equipping.
 Available theater provided equipment and/or Army pre-positioned sets can be used to mitigate equipment shortfalls.  Army will implement forward-funding strategies to execute initial regeneration;
I&R overseas contingency operations funding will reimburse initial costs. 79 The initial course of action the Army is developing focuses on regeneration of respectively. 80 Following the initial response and conduct of operations to resolve and stabilize the crisis, the Army's goal would be to expand the force to achieve these objective BOG:Dwell ratios.
The challenge is to maintain enough units to be able to meet the surge demands and then have the strategic depth to rapidly expand the force to support sustained operations. This challenge can be overcome if the reserve component is sized to meet expected requirements; RC force structure (BCTs, enablers, etc.) must be sized to address ARFORGEN RC objective BOG:Dwell ratios as well as the sourcing of late deploying enablers for all components. Thus, regeneration can focus on the strategic requirements for forces beyond all component's existing force structure. As was experienced during OIF and OEF, the ARFORGEN model BOG:Dwell times and the numbers of units were adjusted (Grow the Army Initiative) to meet strategic and operational requirements.
Importantly, the assumption that the Army will retain and identify upwards of Moreover, ongoing mobilization studies will help inform the basing options associated with this assumption.
The assumption that "additional AC endstrength may be required to expand beyond (3) IBCTs" does not fully reflect the lessons from recent expansion efforts for the Army. This assumption is looking at generating more than three IBCTs when it must also, more broadly, consider the simultaneous need to generate the units that support
BCTs. Generally, the creation of three 3,500 Soldier IBCTs also requires extensive additional manpower for the enablers to support these brigades; the problem is not just about expanding beyond three IBCTs, it is about having the enabling forces that are required to support the IBCTs that are generated. The manpower bill for expanding beyond three IBCTs could likely not be achieved by cross-leveling manpower internal to the active Army, but instead would require an increased reliance on the reserve component or a corresponding increase in endstrength. The Army is also developing branches to their base case IBCT course of action.
The first is to regenerate two IBCTs in the first two years (one per year) and then regenerate an ABCT in the third year. The second branch is to regenerate three twomaneuver battalion IBCTs with enablers from existing three-maneuver battalion IBCTs in one year. 84 In support of the base and branch plans, the Army has conducted analyses across the DOTLMPF domains to develop a timeline that accounts for key training, manning and equipping requirements. 85 Significantly, the analysis incorporates many of the lessons learned from the past decade's transformation-related initiatives.
Also, detailed manning and equipping documents (such as modified tables of organization and equipment or MTOEs) are being developed to facilitate the integration of cadre personnel and efficient equipping of the BCTs. operational characteristics, and also challenge the assumptions that frame I&R plans and programs. 89 As General Dempsey stated in testimony to Congress: "we generally find that we don't predict the future with any degree of accuracy." 90 As requirements in the strategy or environment change, such as forward presence commitments or shaping and deterring options, contingency responses will have to be modified.
For BCT I&R to mitigate risk, the Army is using a series of contingency scenarios to examine potential future demand requirements. 91 Moreover, force managers are already leveraging the work of the TAA 15-19 Capability Demand Analysis to consider future demands over multi-year scenarios that includes a range of military missions. 92 In parallel, studies such as "U.S. Ground Force Capabilities through 2020" produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies provide an objective assessment of the predicted range, scale and demand for future military ground operations. 93 These studies inform stakeholders and productively challenge existing contingency models.
Ultimately, to anticipate demand, the I&R problem will also have to be considered Future analysis should examine the full range of requirements and risks and take into account how allied and partner militaries evolve. 94 The Center for Strategic and
International Studies' recent study asserts that U.S. military armored capabilities will 25 remain in demand and that this armored capability is becoming harder to resource from our allies' armies. 95 The study indicates that: "Partner nations' ground force capabilities are increasingly converging toward middleweight forces with regional, rather than global The timing assumption guiding BCT I&R is very short with only "18 months from execution to earliest arrival date." 99 Timeliness is important but these regenerated BCTs will most likely replace or reinforce already deployed units after the initial crisis is stabilized. Consequently, they could feasibly be formed with resources drawn from all three components.
A multi-component BCT course of action should be developed and assessed formations. 104 This investment is being refined through ongoing grade plate reviews to potentially retain a limited number of personnel in the force at higher skill levels than may be required by those generating force positions so they can fill BCT positions when Additionally, the leaders in these standing cadre formations could develop relationships with the division headquarters and collocated active BCTs that the newly organized BCT will ultimately deploy to combat. These I&R cadre organizations could participate in division exercises to cultivate an appreciation for how the potential higher headquarters will conduct mission command in a deployed environment. This consolidated core of cadre could also develop a training program that sustains key skills and staff competencies related to their BCT operational tasks. Ultimately, the capacity of the consolidated cadre could be monitored with a supporting I&R BCT readiness reporting system that could be incorporated into existing Army readiness reporting processes.
The consolidation of ADVON personnel into cadre units will clearly result in an immediate loss in capability when a TSB or part of a garrison command is pulled from its primary mission to regenerate a BCT. However, under the current plan, the generating force is already going to carry a large part of this ADVON burden and will already need to backfill these positions. Moreover, an expanded use of generating force This paper examined the force structure options under the current budget reductions. However, the DoD will likely have to make additional defense cuts in the future. 124 With further cuts, the Army's Investment and Regeneration efforts could become even more important and larger in scope. As Secretary McHugh has stated:
"Reversibility is the sine qua non to ensuring that the Army can rapidly grow when our Nation calls." 125 The urgency to make investment and regeneration a sustainable part of the integrated plan for Army 2020 is palpable and deserves continued synchronization, experimentation, assessment and creative solutions to ensure the Army remains "the Nation's force of decisive action, ready today and prepared for tomorrow."
126 78 "First, the Army must maintain a strong cadre of noncommissioned and mid-grade officers to form the core of new formations when needed. . . Second, we will make significant investments in Army Special Operations forces to increase their capabilities and provide the President with more options. . . Third, it will require ready and accessible Army National Guard and Army Reserve Forces. The Army's reserve component has proven essential in contingency operations around the world. . . the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have evolved into indispensible parts of our operational force, and we will continue to rely on them to provide depth and versatility to meet complex demands of the future. . . The forth critical component of the Army's ability to expand is the Nation's industrial base. We rely on the industrial base to perform research and development and to design, produce and maintain our weapons systems, components and parts. It must be capable of rapidly expanding to meet a large demand. 
